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Modeling and Verification of a Dual Chamber Implantable
Pacemaker
Zhihao Jiang, Miroslav Pajic, Salar Moarref, Rajeev Alur, Rahul Mangharam
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA, USA

Abstract. The design and implementation of software for medical devices is challenging
due to their rapidly increasing functionality and the tight coupling of computation, control,
and communication. The safety-critical nature and the lack of existing industry standards
for verification, make this an ideal domain for exploring applications of formal modeling and analysis. In this paper, we use a dual chamber implantable pacemaker as a case
study for modeling and verification of control algorithms for medical devices in UPPAAL.
We present detailed models of different components of the pacemaker based on the algorithm descriptions from Boston Scientific. We formalize basic safety requirements based
on specifications from Boston Scientific as well as additional physiological knowledge. The
most critical potential safety violation for a pacemaker is that it may lead the closed-loop
system into an undesirable pattern (for example, Tachycardia). Modern pacemakers are
implemented with termination algorithms to prevent such conditions. We show how to
identify these conditions and check correctness of corresponding termination algorithms
by augmenting the basic models with monitors for detecting undesirable patterns. Along
with emerging tools for code generation from UPPAAL models, this effort enables model
driven design and certification of software for medical devices.
Keywords: Medical Devices, Implantable Pacemaker, Software Verification, Cyber-Physical
Systems

1

Introduction

Over the past four decades, cardiac rhythm management devices such as pacemakers have expanded their role from “keeping the patient alive” to “making the patient’s life comfortable”.
The addition of more safety and efficacy features has resulted in increased complexity, inevitably
leading to more safety violations. From 1996-2006, the percentage of software-related causes in
medical device recalls have grown from 10% to 21% [1]. During the first half of 2010, the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued 23 recalls of defective devices, all of which are
categorized as Class I, meaning there is a “reasonable probability that use of these products
will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.” At least six of the recalls were caused
by software defects [2]. As a result, there is a pressing need for standards and tools to certify
and verify the safety of software in medical devices. Unlike other industries such as aviation and
automotive, the safety concern in the medical device domain is focused on the physical plant, the
patient in this case, rather than the controller. As a result, although in aviation and automotive
industries, standards are enforced during software development, manufacturing, and post-market
change [3, 4], there are no well-established standards for development of software for medical devices. This has prompted recent interest in applying formal modeling and verification techniques
to the domain of medical devices [5, 6].
In [7], we proposed a framework to test and validate an Implantable Cardiac Device. In this
paper, we design a basic dual chamber pacemaker (DDD) in the model checker UPPAAL [8]
and verify it against a set of basic safety requirements. The most critical safety violation for

II

Hi
s
Bundl
e
Ri
ght
At
r
i
um

At
r
i
ovent
r
i
cul
ar
(
AV)node

Ri
ght
Vent
r
i
cl
e

Fig. 1. Electrical Conduction System of the heart

a pacemaker occurs when the pacemaker drives a normal heart into an undesirable condition.
The pacemaker software incorporates correction algorithms that are designed to terminate such
behaviors. In this paper we discuss two important illustrative cases that are classified as “Pacemaker Mediated Tachycardia (PMT)”. We build formal models of the two anti-PMT correction
algorithms in UPPAAL, and verify that they terminate the undesirable conditions as intended.
Then we verify whether the pacemaker, augmented with the anti-PMT algorithms, still satisfies the safety properties. A similar approach can be used to model and verify other advanced
pacemaker algorithms.
Our models and specifications are designed based on descriptions available from Boston Scientific [9, 10], a leading manufacturer of pacemakers, and on extensive medical literature on this
topic. At each step of the modeling and verification process, we discuss and justify the choice
of heart model, and in particular, we argue that a more physiologically-relevant heart model is
needed for more complex properties. The UPPAAL model developed in this paper is freely available online [11]. We hope that these models can be used as a starting point for many purposes
(e.g. to build models with costs and probabilities for quantitative analysis). In particular, the
verified pacemaker model can be translated into Stateflow charts in Simulink for test generation
and code generation [12].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the basics about the heart and
pacemaker. Section 3 presents UPPAAL models of the basic DDD pacemaker and the heart. In
Section 4, we specify two core safety properties that need to hold for all pacemakers, and verify
the basic pacemaker model against them. In Section 5, we describe two cases where the pacemaker drives a healthy heart into undesirable states. For each case, we show the existence of the
undesirable behaviors using existential queries in UPPAAL and verify whether the corresponding
correction algorithms eliminate these behaviors.

2

Heart and Pacemaker Basics

The coordinated contraction of the heart is governed by its Electrical Conduction System (see
Fig. 1). The Sinoatrial (SA) node, which is a collection of specialized tissue at the top of the
right atrium, periodically generates electrical pulses that can cause muscle contraction. The SA
node is controlled by the nervous system and acts as the primary and natural pacemaker of
the heart. The electrical pulses first cause both atria to contract, forcing the blood into the
ventricles. The electrical conduction is then delayed at the Atrioventricular (AV) node, allowing
the ventricles to fill fully. Finally the fast-conducting His-Pukinje system spreads the electrical
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activation within both ventricles, causing simultaneous contraction of the ventricular muscles,
and pumps the blood out of the heart.
Due to aging and/or diseases, the conduction properties of heart tissue in the electrical
conduction system may change. These changes may cause timing anomalies in heart rhythm,
thus decrease the blood pumping efficiency of the heart. These timing anomalies are referred
to as arrhythmias, and are categorized into Tachycardia and Bradycardia. Tachycardia features
undesirable fast heart rate which impairs hemodynamics. Bradycardia features slow heart rate
which results in insufficient blood supply. Bradycardia maybe due to failure of impulse generation
with anomalies in the SA node, or failure of impulse propagation where the conduction from atria
to the ventricles is delayed or blocked.
Since the heart tissue can be activated by external electrical pulses, Bradycardia can be
treated by providing electrical pulses when the heart rate is low. Implantable Pacemakers have
been developed to deliver timely electrical pulses to the heart to maintain an appropriate heart
rate and Atrial-Ventricular synchrony. Implantable pacemakers normally have two leads fixed on
the wall of the right atrium and the right ventricle. Activation of local tissue is sensed by the
leads, triggering Atrial Sense (AS) and Ventricular Sense (VS) events. Atrial Pacing (AP) and
Ventricular Pacing (VP) are delivered if no sensed events occur within deadlines.
In order to deal with different heart conditions, modern pacemakers are able to operate
in different modes. The modes are labeled using a three character system. The first character
describes the pacing locations, the second character describes the sensing locations, and the third
character describes how the pacemaker software responds to sensing. In this work we describe
the most commonly used mode of pacemaker, the DDD mode that paces both the atrium and
the ventricle, senses both chambers, and sensing can both activate or inhibit further pacing.
Similarly, the VDI mode paces only in the ventricle, senses both chambers, and inhibits pacing
if event is sensed. [13]

3
3.1

System Modeling
Timed Automata and UPPAAL

Timed automaton [14] is an extension of a finite automaton with a finite set of real-valued clocks.
It has been used for modeling and verifying systems which are triggered by events and have timing
constraints between events. From the Boston Scientific pacemaker specification [9], the pacemaker
can be modeled using this Extended Timed Automata notation, which is a subset of formal
semantics in UPPAAL. UPPAAL ([8, 15]) is a standard tool for modeling and verification of
real-time systems, based on networks of timed automata. The graphical and text-based interface
makes modeling more intuitive. Requirements can be specified using Computational Tree Logic
(CTL) [16] and violations can be visualized in the simulation environment.
3.2

System Overview

We modeled both the heart and the pacemaker in UPPAAL. The overview of the closed-loop
system is showed in Fig. 2(a). The heart and the pacemaker communicate with each other
using broadcast channels. The heart generates Aget! and Vget! actions, representing atrial and
ventricular events that the pacemaker take as inputs. The pacemaker processes the signals and
generates pacing actions AP! and VP! to the corresponding components in the heart.
3.3

Basic DDD pacemaker modeling

The DDD pacemaker has 5 basic timing cycles, as shown in Fig. 2(b). We correspondingly
decomposed our pacemaker model into 5 components which correspond to the 5 timers. These
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Fig. 2. (a) System Overview, (b) Basic 5 timing cycles of DDD pacemaker

components communicate with each other using broadcast channels and shared variables. The
pacemaker design is shown in Fig. 3.
Lower Rate Interval (LRI): This component keeps the heart rate above a minimum value.
The LRI automation models the basic timing cycle which defines the longest interval between two
ventricular events. The clock is reset when a ventricular event (VS, VP) is received. If no atrial
event has been sensed (AS), the component will deliver atrial pacing (AP) after TLRI-TAVI.
The UPPAAL design of LRI component is shown in Fig. 3 (a).
AS?

AS?
VS?

LRI

AP!

VS?
VP?

VP?

(a) LRI component
Aget?
VS?
VP?

AVI

VS?

VP!

(c) URI component

(b) AVI component
PVARP

AS!

Vget?

AR!

VP?

(d) PVARP component

URI

VP?

VRP

VS!

(e) VRP component

Fig. 3. Components of the pacemaker model in UPPAAL
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Atrio-Ventricular Interval (AVI) and Upper Rate Interval (URI): The function of
the AVI component is to maintain synchrony between the atria and the ventricles. It defines
the longest interval between an atrial event and a ventricular event. If no ventricular event
has been sensed (VS) within TAVI after an atrial event (AS, AP), the component will deliver
ventricular pacing (VP). In order to prevent the pacemaker from pacing the ventricle too fast,
a URI component uses a global clock clk to track the time after a ventricular event (VS, VP).
The URI automation limits the ventricular pacing rate by enforcing a lower bound on the times
between consecutive ventricle events. If the global clock value is less than TURI when the AVI
component is about to deliver VP, AVI component will hold VP and deliver it after the global
clock reaches TURI. The UPPAAL design of AVI and URI component is shown in Fig. 3 (b) and
(c).
Post Ventricular Atrial Refractory Period (PVARP) and Post Ventricular Atrial
Blanking (PVAB): The PVARP and the PVAB are initialized by ventricular events. Atrial
events during PVAB are ignored and atrial events during PVARP trigger AR event which can
be used in some advanced algorithms. The UPPAAL design of PVARP component is shown in
Fig. 3 (d).
Ventricular Refractory Period (VRP): Along with the PVARP and PVAB, the VRP is are
used to filter noise and early events which could otherwise cause undesired pacemaker behavior.
For physiological reasons, there is a blanking interval after each ventricular event that no ventricular event can happen. In our pacemaker model, a VRP period follows each ventricular event
(VS, VP) in order to filter noise. The UPPAAL design of VRP component is shown in Fig. 3 (e).
Parameter Selection: In this model, values for parameters are fixed so the model is only
one instance of a DDD pacemaker. The values we choose for the parameters in this pacemaker
model are nominal values in clinical settings [10], with TAVI=150, TLRI=1000, TPVARP=100,
TVRP=150, TURI=400, TPVAB=50.
3.4

Random Heart Model (RHM)

To verify pacemaker software, it is essential to have a heart model that covers all possible inputs to
the pacemaker. Since the pacemaker has only two input channels, and it only responds to timing
relations between input actions, we use a Random Heart Model (RHM) to non-deterministically
cover all pacemaker inputs. The UPPAAL model of atrial RHM is shown in Fig. 4. The interval
between each action (Aget!) is a random value from the interval [Aminwait, Amaxwait]. By
constraining these two parameters, the RHM covers just a subset of the heart behavior in terms
of the heart rate. In the case study, we show that the single parameter representation of the
heart is inadequate and argue that for complex heart conditions a more detailed heart model is
required.
AP?

Aget!
RHM-A

Fig. 4. Random Heart Model for Atrial Channel

4

Verification of the bottom-line safety properties

In this section, we describe the verification of the bottom-line safety properties, which need to
hold for all pacemakers.

VI

Fig. 5. (a) Monitor for LRL: Interval between two ventricular events should be less than TLRI, (b)
Monitor for URL: Interval between a ventricular event and a VP should be longer than TURI

4.1

Lower Rate Limit

The most essential function for the pacemaker is to maintain the ventricular rate above a certain threshold. The monitor P vv is designed in Fig. 5(a). The property A[] (Pvv.two a imply
Pvv.t≤TLRI) has been verified for the basic DDD pacemaker model.
4.2

Upper Rate Limit

The pacemaker can only pace the heart to increase its rate and cannot slow it down, thus it is
important to guarantee it does not pace beyond a maximum rate to ensure safe operation. To
this effect, an upper rate limit is specified such that the pacemaker can increase the ventricular
rate up to this limit. This limit is a strict requirement that needs to hold no matter what new
functions are added.
We require that a ventricle pace (VP) can only occur at least T U RI after a ventricle event (VS,
VP). The monitor for the property is shown in Fig. 5(b) and the property A[] (PURI test.interval
imply PURI test.t≥TURI) has been verified for the basic DDD pacemaker model.
4.3

Discussion

With the RHM, the heart conditions can only be encoded using the heart rate, and hence the
properties are very basic. We therefore call the properties in this section bottom-line safety
properties. We will later observe that there exist undesired behaviors even if the bottom-line
safety properties are satisfied. In addition, with this simple encoding it is ambiguous whether
an undesired behavior is triggered by the heart itself or by the pacemaker’s intervention. In this
work we are only interested in the situation when the pacemaker adversely affects the safety
of the heart. In order to resolve the ambiguity, we need to adjust the heart rate so that the
undesired heart condition is not covered by the heart model. When the heart condition is too
complex to be encoded by the heart rate alone, a heart model with higher fidelity is needed.

5

Verification of Anti-PMT algorithms

Although the pacemaker model satisfied the bottom line safety requirements, the pacemaker
can still increase the heart rate as fast as the upper rate limit, which in certain situations is
inappropriate. These scenarios are referred to as Pacemaker Mediated Tachycardia (PMT). In
this section, we show the existence of two well-understood PMT cases and verify whether the
corresponding anti-PMT algorithms can successfully terminate the PMT.
5.1

Verification Process

The pacemaker manufacturers have developed anti-PMT algorithms to terminate different PMT
scenarios. In this section, we propose a general procedure to verify the safety and correctness of
such anti-PMT algorithms. The general steps for the methodology include:
1. Show existence of PMT behaviors in the closed-loop system
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Fig. 6. Simulated Heart-Pacemaker interaction for SVT [17]

2. Introduce anti-PMT algorithms and check whether the bottom-line safety requirements still
hold
3. Verify the anti-PMT algorithms by showing the non-existence of PMT scenarios
Here we use two well-identified PMT cases to demonstrate the methodology.
5.2

Verification of the Mode-Switch algorithm

Supraventricular Tachycardia (SVT): SVT is an arrhythmia which features an abnormally
fast atrial rate. Fig. 6 is a series of simulation results for closed-loop interaction between a heart
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Fig. 7. Monitor for SVT: There exists an endless sequence in which interval between ventricular events
is at most TURI

model with SVT and the pacemaker model. The atrial and ventricular channels show electrogram
inputs to the pacemaker and the pacemaker channel shows the corresponding events received and
generated by the pacemaker software, [17].
Typically the AV node, which has a long refractory period, can filter most of the fast atrial
activations during SVT. This causes 2:1 or 3:1 A-V conduction and the ventricular rate remains
normal (see Fig. 6 (a)). As an arrhythmia, SVT is still considered as a safe heart condition since
the ventricles operate under normal rate can still maintain adequate cardiac output. However,
when a dual chamber pacemaker is introduced into a heart with SVT, the AVI component of the
pacemaker introduces a pathway in addition to the intrinsic conduction pathway between the
atria and the ventricles. Since the atrial rate is fast, the ventricles will be paced for every sensed
atrial event (AS). The pacemaker tries to maintain A-V synchrony and thus causes dangerous
Ventricular Tachycardia (see Fig. 6 (b)). Since the tachycardia is caused by pacemaker, it is one
case of PMT.
Mode-switch algorithms have been developed to terminate the tachycardia by switching the
pacemaker into a Fallback mode during SVT. In the fallback mode the AVI component is disabled
and the pacemaker only maintains adequate ventricular rate. Once SVT terminates, the algorithm
switches the pacemaker back to dual chamber mode (see Fig. 6 (c)).
Existence of PMT during SVT: To show existence of PMT during SVT, we need to first
adjust the heart model to cover SVT scenarios. The interval for the atrial RHM is set to [100,
200], so that the atrial rate is fast enough. We then need to ensure the fast ventricular rate in
PMT is due to pacemaker intervention rather than the heart itself. To this end, the interval
for the ventricular RHM is set to [500,800]. This rate is slow enough not to be considered as
tachycardia, but faster than the Lower Rate Limit of the pacemaker so that pacemaker should
not intervene. The constraint heart model covers a subset of the input space which can trigger the
closed-loop system into PMT. The monitor Pv v is designed to show existence of PMT during
SVT. It goes to the error state if the ventricular rate drops below the Upper Rate Limit (Fig. 7).
The existence property E[](notP v v.err), which verifies if there exists an execution in which
the ventricular interval is always less or equal to TURI. The property is first verified on pacemaker
without the mode-switch algorithm. The property is satisfied during verification.
Mode-Switch algorithm: Intuitively, the mode-switch algorithm first detects SVT. After
confirmed detection, it switches the pacemaker from a dual-chamber mode to a single-chamber
mode. During the single-chamber mode, the A-V synchrony function of the pacemaker is deactivated thus the ventricular rate is decoupled from the fast atrial rate. After the algorithm
determines the end of SVT, it will switch the pacemaker back to the dual chamber mode.
The mode-switch algorithm specification we use is the same as the one used in Boston Scientific pacemakers [10]. The algorithm first measures the interval between atrial events outside the
blanking period (AS, AR). The interval is considered as fast if it is above a threshold (Trigger
Rate) and slow otherwise (see Fig. 8 (1)). A counter increments for fast event and decrement for
slow event (see Fig. 8 (2)). After the counter value reaches the Entry Count, the algorithm will
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Fig. 8. Mode-Switch algorithm

start a Duration which is a time interval used to confirm the detection of SVT (see Fig. 8 (3)). In
the Duration, the counter keeps counting. If the counter value is still positive after the Duration,
the pacemaker will switch to the VDI mode (Fallback mode). In the VDI mode, the pacemaker
only senses and paces the ventricle. At any time if the counter reaches zero, the Duration will
terminate and the pacemaker is switched back to DDD mode.
In our UPPAAL model of the mode-switch algorithm, we use nominal parameter values from
the clinical setting. We define trigger rate at 170bpm (350ms), entry count at 8, duration for 8
ventricular events and fallback mode as VDI.
In order to model both DDD and VDI modes and the switching between them, we made
modifications to the AVI and LRI components. In each component two copies for both modes
are modeled, and switch between each other when switching events (DDD, VDI) are received.
During VDI mode, VP is delivered by the LRI component instead of the AVI component. The
clock values are shared between both copies in order to preserve essential intervals even after
switching.The modified AVI and LRI components are shown in Fig. 9.
Verification against bottom line safety requirements: We verify the same bottom line
safety requirements on the pacemaker model with mode-switch algorithm. The Upper Rate Limit
AS?
VS?
VP?
DDD?
VDI?

AS?
VS?
LRIMS

AP!

AP?
DDD?

AVIMS

VP!

VDI?

Fig. 9. New LRI & AVI component
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property is satisfied but the Lower Rate Limit property is violated. When the pacemaker is switching from VDI mode to DDD mode, the responsibility to deliver VP switched from LRI component
to AVI component. Since the clock reference is different in both components (Ventricular events
in LRI and Atrial events in AVI), the clock value for delivering the next VP is not preserved. As
a result, if an atrial event which triggered the mode-switch from VDI to DDD happens within
[TLRI-TAVI, TLRI) after the last ventricular event, the next ventricular pacing will be delayed
by at most TAVI time, which violates the Lower Rate Limit property (Fig. 11(a)). This safety
violation should be taken into consideration by the pacemaker manufacturers.

Verification of the algorithm: We now present the verification of the correctness of the
mode-switch algorithm by checking the same existence property E[] (not Pv v.err) on pacemaker
with mode-switch algorithm. We expect the violation of this property, since during VDI mode
the ventricular rate of the heart model is less than the Upper Rate Limit and will not trigger
ventricular pacing. The counter example of the violation should show that mode-switch algorithm
successfully switches the mode of the pacemaker to VDI mode. However, this property is still
satisfied, indicating the mode-switch algorithm failed to eliminate the PMT scenario. Since the
atrial rate for our heart model is always above the trigger rate, mode switch to VDI mode will
always eventually happen. The monitor PMS for the property is shown in Fig. 10. The property

Fig. 10. Monitor for Mode-Switch: Whether mode-switch to VDI mode will always eventually happen.

A<> (PMS.err) is not satisfied. The counter-example shows that some of the atrial events fall
into the Post Ventricular Atrial Blanking period (PVAB) and got ignored. As a result, two fast
intervals may be considered as one slow interval (see Fig. 11(b)). If this happens more than one
out of the Entry Count, mode-switch from DDD to VDI may never happen.

Discussion: In this case study we were able to identify undesired behaviors using existence
properties in UPPAAL, and showed the behavior is due to pacemaker intervention by using a
constrained heart model. We also verified that the mode-switch algorithm may not always terminate undesired behavior. This scenario may not appear during open-loop testing and provides
an argument in favor of verification for medical devices. The potential safety violation showed
that addition of new algorithms may result in safety violations.
VDI

MS
AS

AS

DDD

Slow
AS

Aget
Fast

TAVI

Fast

TLRI

VS (VP)

PVAB

VP
(a)

AS

VS

(b)

Fig. 11. (a) Safety Violation: VP is delayed due to the reset of timer during mode-switch, (b) Correctness
Violation: The blocking period may block some atrial events, turning two Fast events to one Slow event
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Fig. 12. Endless Loop Tachycardia case study demonstrating the situation when the pacemaker drives
the heart into an unsafe state [18]

5.3

Verification of Endless Loop Tachycardia (ELT) algorithm

We now focus on another PMT case, Endless Loop Tachycardia (ELT), because the mechanism
of ELT is mostly independent of the heart rate. With this case study we argue that the basic
RHM is inadequate to verify the correctness and safety of the anti-ELT algorithm, and hence, a
more detailed heart model is required.
ELT overview: The AVI component of a dual-chamber pacemaker introduces a virtual A-V
pathway which forms a loop with the intrinsic A-V conduction pathway (see Fig. 12(a)). In
this scenario, a ventricular event (VS) triggers a V-A conduction through the intrinsic pathway
(Marker 1 in Fig. 12(b)). The pacemaker registers this signal as an Atrial Sense (AS) (Marker 2
in Fig. 12(b)). This event triggers VP after TAVI, as if the signal conducts through the virtual
A-V pathway (Marker 3 in Fig. 12(b)). The VP will trigger another V-A conduction and this
VP-AS-VP-AS looping behavior will continue (see Fig. 12(b)). The interval between atrial events
is TAVI plus the V-A conduction delay, which will drive the ventricular rate as high as the Upper
Rate Limit.
From the pacemaker point of view, the pacemaker paces the ventricles as specified for every AS. That is why open-loop testing is unable to detect this closed-loop behavior. Modern
pacemakers are equipped with anti-ELT algorithms to identify and terminate potential ELT.
One common algorithm identifies ELT by the ELT pattern and terminates ELT by increasing
TPVARP time once to block the AS caused by the V-A conduction.
Existence of ELT: We first ensure that the heart model does not cover the ELT pattern,
so that the pattern is induced by the pacemaker. To resolve the ambiguity, we set both the

PELT_det

Pv_v

Fig. 13. Monitor for ELT: VP-AS pattern detection and Upper Rate detection
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RHM-V

(a) Adjusted RHM

(b) New heart model

(c) Conduction component

Fig. 14. Modified heart model and the conduction component

atrial interval and the ventricular interval above TURI. Two monitors were designed to show the
existence of ELT. One monitor, PELT det, shows the persistence of the VP-AS pattern and the
other monitor, Pvv, shows that the ventricular rate is always no slower than the upper rate limit
(Fig. 13). The existence property E[] ((not PELT det.err) && (not Pvv.err)) fails on pacemaker
without an anti-ELT algorithm.
The reason for the failure is that the atrial rate during ELT is not determined by the atrial
rate of the heart model. It is determined by the TAVI and the V-A conduction delay. This shows
that describing heart conditions using the heart rate alone is inadequate.
In order to verify properties regarding ELT, we need to have a more detailed heart model.
In addition to the original heart model, we model the A-V conduction of the heart. The adjusted RHM and the conduction component is shown in Fig. 14. For each atrial event Aget, the
conduction component generates V act after certain delay and vice versa. The conduction is
non-deterministic so that the new heart model is an over approximation of the original one. The
PVARP and VRP components are also modified to accommodate new events A act and V act.
After introducing the conduction component, the existence property holds, indicating the
new heart model covers ELT.
The ELT-termination algorithm:
utilizes these three features:

The ELT detection algorithm by Boston Scientific [9]

– Ventricular rate at Upper rate limit
– VP-AS pattern
– Fixed V-A conduction delay
The pacemaker first monitors VP-AS pattern with ventricular rate at upper rate limit. Then it
compares the VP-AS interval with previous intervals. ELT is confirmed if the difference between
the current VP-AS interval and the first VP-AS interval are within ±32ms for 16 consecutive
times. Then the pacemaker increases the PVARP period to 500ms once so that the next AS will
be blocked and will not trigger a VP. ELT will then be terminated.
As the V-A conduction delays are patient-specific, the algorithm compares VP-AS interval
to a previously sensed value instead of an absolute value. Since we can not store past clock
values in UPPAAL, we can not explicitly model this ELT detection algorithm. However, since
the conduction delay in our heart model is within a known range, we can compare the VP-AS
interval with this range. The VP-AS pattern detection module for our anti-ELT algorithm is
shown in Fig. 15 (1). It detects the VP-AS pattern with ventricular rate at upper rate limit and
sends out VP AS event if the interval qualifies.
A counter counts the number of qualified VP-AS patterns. It increases the PVARP period to
500ms if eight consecutive VP-AS patterns are detected. (Fig. 15 (2)) The PVARP component is
also modified so that the PVARP period can only be changed once by the anti-ELT algorithm.
(Fig. 15 (3))
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Verification against bottom line safety requirements: The two bottom line safety requirements still hold when the anti-ELT algorithm is introduced.
Verification of the algorithm: The same existence property E[] ((not PELT det.err) &&
(not Pvv.err)) is not satisfied after the anti-ELT algorithm is introduced, indicating the algorithm
successfully terminates ELT. We successfully reproduced the case when the algorithm works in
the simulation environment of UPPAAL.
Discussion: In this case study, we showed that a more realistic heart model is needed to specify
more complex closed-loop properties. Ideally the AS event should be triggered by activation from
the SA node so that it represents the intrinsic heart rhythm. However extrinsic signals such as
the V-A conduction may also trigger AS. The pacemaker can not distinguish such signals from
the intrinsic heart rhythm. This ambiguity often results in undesired closed-loop behaviors like
ELT. As the original RHM does not provide enough information to distinguish these signals, we
extended the heart model for verification of the anti-ELT algorithm.

6

Related Work

Tuan et. al propose an RTS formal model for pacemaker and its environment and verified it
against number of safety properties and timed constraints using PAT model checker [19]. They
have modeled the pacemaker for all 18 operating modes as described in Boston scientific, but
their work lacks specifying and analyzing complex behaviors of pacemaker like mode switch.
Wiggelinkhuizen uses mCRL2 and UPPAAL to formally model the pacemaker from the firmware
design of Vitatron’s DA+ pacemaker [20]. Two main approaches have been used to investigate
the feasibility of applying formal model checking to the design of device firmware. The main
approach consists of verifying the firmware model in context of a formal heart model and a formal model of a hardware module which fails for high heart rates because of the state explosion.
Another approach is to verify a part of firmware design which was feasible and was able to detect
a known deadlock rather soon.
Macedo et. al have developed a concurrent and distributed real time model for a cardiac pacemaker through a pragmatic incremental approach. The models are expressed using the VDM
and are validated primarily by scenario-based test, where test scenarios are defined to model
interesting situations such as the absence of input pulses [21]. The models cover 8 modes of
pacemaker operation.
Gomes et. al present a formal specification of pacemaker system using the Z notation in [22].
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Fig. 16. Time Consumption and State Exploration

They have also tried to validate that the formal specification satisfies the informal requirements
of Boston Scientific by using a theorem prover, ProofPower-Z. They have partially checked the
consistency of their specification through reasoning. No validation experiment regarding safety
conditions were performed yet. [22]
Mery et. al ,in [23], formally model all operational modes of a single electrode pacemaker system
using event-B and prove them . They use an incremental proof-based approach to refine the basic
abstract model of system and add more functional and timing properties. They use ProB tool to
validate their models in different situations such as absence of input pulses.
Jee et. al present a safety assured development approach of real time software using pacemaker
as their case study in [24]. They formally model and verify the VVI mode of pacemaker using
UPPAAL and then implement it and check the preservation of properties transferred from model
to implementation code.

7

Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we present a through analysis and verification of a dual chamber pacemaker. The
specific contributions of the paper are: a) We modeled a dual chamber pacemaker in UPPAAL
and verified the model against a set of safety properties. b) We identified two cases of PMT and
verified the correctness and safety of two corresponding anti-PMT algorithms. c) Through this
process we showed addition of more complex algorithm may result in safety violations. d) We
also showed the necessity of a high fidelity heart model for verifying more complex properties. e)
The procedure we used to verify anti-PMT algorithms can be used in general for medical device
verification and certification. The time consumption and state exploration for the verifications
are shown in Fig. 16. The UPPAAL model developed in this paper is freely available online [11].
We hope that these models can be used as a starting point for many purposes (e.g. to build
models with costs and probabilities for quantitative analysis).
We only verified one instance of a DDD pacemaker since the parameters are fixed. In the
future we would like to verify safety and correctness of pacemakers with parameters within
the programmable range. There are also many algorithms implemented in the pacemaker to
improve the quality of patient’s life. As future work we would like to evaluate the efficiency of
those algorithms by assigning costs for different heart conditions. The evaluation can be used
to develop better treatment for general and specific patients. This requires a heart model with
higher fidelity. In [7] we developed a high-fidelity heart model (VHM) which can be used for
simulation and testing. The model is deterministic thus is not suitable for verification. However
its timed-automata notation enables us to use model refinement to develop a series of heart model
with increasing complexity. These models can be used in different levels for device certification.
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